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1. Introduction 
Using a comparative approach, this chapter explores the ethical and legal implications of States’ behaviours in 
rationing healthcare resources during the Covid-19 crisis. It focuses on Italy and the UK respectively, looking at 
the first country in Europe to deal with the uncontrolled spread of the virus (in February 2020) and at the one with 
the highest death rate in Europe, to date1. As the emergency unfolded, Italy and the UK both enforced strict 
country-wide lockdowns to ease pressure on their national healthcare systems and to attempt containment of the 
pandemic. However, it soon became plain that available healthcare resources were insufficient within both states, 
following years of not dissimilar economic rationalisation policies. In Italy, the Sistema Sanitario Nazionale (SSN) 
remains deeply underfunded: a recent Foundation GIMBE report identified that its public funding grew at an 
average of only 0.9% per year, at a lower rate than the annual inflation average (1.07%). The UK’s under-
resourcing of its National Health System (NHS) has also long been apparent to advocates for the right to health 
and equitable resource allocation2. The chronic fragilities of both nations’ healthcare systems had clearly impeded 
the right to (good or adequate) health, health equity, and the principle of equality of treatment; this was so, long 
before Covid-19 forced law and policy makers to frame increasingly fragile medical capacities as acute national 
emergencies3. 
Against this backdrop, this chapter discusses the controversial criteria that might be used by doctors (in Italy and 
the UK, respectively) where they are forced to decide upon the rationing of medical treatment, e.g. which patients 
to admit to a scarce ICU bed, or intubate, or not. Put bluntly, where the wider needs of the populace outstrip 
available national resources, questions must be asked as to whether such a behavioural, hard choices blueprint for 
rationing is ethically correct, even where it has ostensibly been justified in domestic law or tolerated within 
international human rights law terms (i.e. justified discrimination). Even if warranted from a utilitarian ethical 
perspective, negative impacts may still affect those who are, or rapidly become, the most vulnerable, particularly 
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older and/or disabled or frail persons. Potential violations of Articles 2 (right to life), 3 (avoidance of inhuman or 
degrading treatment) and 14 ECHR (non-discrimination) are entirely, perhaps inevitably, possible.   
2. Italy versus the UK 
The spread of Covid-19 in Italy brought increased demand for ICU admissions when many patients began to suffer 
acute respiratory failure4. This changed the general approach to ICU admissions, which had been previously based 
on the traditional principle of therapeutic appropriateness5. The Società Italiana di Anestesia Analgesia 
Rianimazione e Terapia Intensiva (Italian Society of Anesthesia, Analgesia, Resuscitation and Intensive Care – 
SIAAARTI) shared their guidance on the admissions criteria which would identify only certain types of patient 
as eligible for ICU treatment6. The aims of these recommendations were: «  (A) to relieve clinicians from a part 
of the responsibility in the decisions making process, which can be emotionally burdensome, carried out in 
individual cases, and  (B) to make the allocation criteria for healthcare resources explicit in a condition of their 
own extraordinary scarcity7 ». The guidelines suggest a little flexibility, so as to assess patients’ needs daily, and 
on a case-by-case basis. Key elements included patient age limits, any comorbidities and their functional status8, 
thereby creating new vulnerabilities, and, significantly, treatment obstacles, not least for any particularly frail, 
elderly or disabled patients whose life expectancies would pale in comparison with younger, healthier, or more 
able-bodied persons. The worst-case scenario, where all ICU resources have become completely over-saturated, 
would see a solution grounded in first come, first served criteria: at that point hospitals presumably could legally 
deny access to ICUs for any patients subsequently presenting for treatment (and, presumably, admission or 
assessment).  
The situation in the UK was not quite as clear-cut, but still no less worrying. The use of convoluted frailty 
algorithms (aimed at reserving finite or scarce resources for those who might most benefit from them) seems quite 
akin to Italy’s pragmatic approach to crisis-shaped rationing. It does however alter the notion of the (legally) 
protected characteristic,9 turning it from a legislatively safeguarded status into one that speaks of an enhanced, 
newly dangerous vulnerability10. Impacts upon the rates of hospital admission, untested patient discharges (often 
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have yet to be fully analysed but seem likely to spark significant waves of litigation, potentially at the level of 
Strasbourg complaints12. The continued use of wartime rhetoric and heroic imagery by many British politicians, 
is also somewhat worrying, in terms of further othering those already-vulnerable persons who are often most at 
risk of succumbing to infection13.  
3. Ethical analysis 
In an ideal world, each state would engage in meaningful, distributive justice and provide or ensure sufficiently 
ring-fenced healthcare funding for all who need it: fair and equitable resource allocations would not be tied to 
issues of health-justiciability, nor would they rest upon inherent or acquired patient characteristics such as age, 
mental or physical resilience, poverty, life expectancy, or life-quality14. For now, however, certain vulnerable 
individuals are increasingly considered to be more resource consuming than others. This sets the inescapable need 
to ration against the – surely, over-arching - duty upon states to avoid abject human rights violations where at all 
possible. A utilitarian approach seems to have been adopted by Italy and the UK alike however, with both nations 
crafting rules that aim to maximise benefit for the greatest number of people, irrespective of potential rights 
violations to those who are, or who become, at risk of succumbing to illness15. The current guidelines in both 
countries prioritise and safeguard those with a higher chance of survival, sparking what can be described as an 
increasingly « disablist and worrying rhetoric16 ».  
The Rawlsian publicity condition is similarly flouted, where invisible allocation mechanisms are quickly designed 
and quietly implemented17. As one recent UN Committee (on ESRC rights) stressed, « if States do not act within 
a human rights framework, a clear risk exists that the measures taken might violate ESCRs and increase the 
suffering of the most marginalised groups18 ». Arguably, a parallel pandemic was allowed to arise unseen and 
unchecked within many of the care homes in Italy and the UK, affecting highly vulnerable residents and patients, 
who saw a wide range of their fundamental human rights and interests firmly side-lined in the service of « the 
 
covid-death-rate-six-times-average/. See also R v Cambridge Health Authority (1995) 2 All ER 129 on how the 
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See also DONNELLY Laura, « Protect the NHS' message led to 90 per cent drop in hospital admissions » in The 
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12 IACOBUCCI, Gareth, « Covid-19: Government to issue new guidance on DNAR orders after legal challenge » in 
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18 https://www.conectas.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/ESCRCommitte-COVID.pdf (para 2) 
greater good19 ». In terms of rationing scarce or finite resources, the UK’s Joint Parliamentary Committee on 
Human Rights (analysing the government’s ongoing, ever-changing policy responses to the pandemic) has 
recently called for a formal enquiry into possible Article 2 ECHR violations, suggesting that certain strategies 
clearly amounted to unjustifiable, unnecessary forms of discrimination, under both the European Convention and 
The Equality Act (2020)20. Similar requests have been made in terms of Italy 21. 
4. Legal analysis 
Both Italy and the UK are part of the ECHR and the EU. In addition to Articles 2, 3, 8 and 14 of the ECHR22, as 
clarified above, Article 35 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights establishes that « [e]veryone has the right of 
access to preventive health care and the right to benefit from medical treatment under the conditions established 
by national laws and practices. A high level of human health protection shall be ensured in the definition and 
implementation of all Union policies and activities ». This does not create an absolute right to good or adequate 
health or healthcare however: fairly wide discretion is afforded to domestic states, within which they must organise 
their own systems as best suits them – and manage their health or social care budgets. This is also a key assumption 
by SIIARI, which confirms that « [i]t is implicit that the application of rationing criteria is justifiable only after 
all the subjects involved […] and all possible efforts have been made to increase the availability of resources 
existing (especially the Intensive Care beds)23 ». On the issues of transparency and consent, any reforms to health 
access policies must involve, as far as possible, all concerned parties. Patients - and their families - must be 
informed of the extraordinary nature of certain measures, if only to comply with the duty of transparency, and to 
preserve some level of confidence and trust in the public health service and in those who decision-make or legislate 
for its future, in both the long and short term.  
In relation to issues of non-resuscitation or the refusal of life-saving treatments, it is worth remembering too that 
Italy is a Catholic state: any withholding or withdrawing of essential treatment therefore holds added 
significance24. Appropriate palliative care must always be provided to hypoxic patients when decisions to cease - 
or deny - life-sustaining treatments are made, in accordance with national or international recommendations, and 
as a matter of good clinical practice. Where a prolonged demise is anticipated, patients should be transferred to 
non-ICU beds; optimal palliative care should similarly be provided to those outside of the ICUs. All guidelines, 
policies, and emergent customs on end of life treatment should reflect and adhere to the core principles of human 
dignity and the fundamental medical duty to alleviate human suffering (Article 3, ECHR). And yet, socio-
 
19 For Italy see https://www.dors.it/documentazione/testo/202005/COVID-19-Italy-response.pdf, p. 29, 
(Accessed 31.10.20). For the UK see DALY Mary, « COVID‐19 and care homes in England: What happened and 
why? »; in  Social Policy and Administration; 2020; 1-14, 2. 
20 Joint Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights (2020) ‘The Government’s response to 
COVID-19: Human rights implications’ paras 72-75, available  at 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt5801/jtselect/jtrights/265/26502.htm (accessed 21.11.20).  The 
Department for Health and Social Care (DHSC) (15 April 2020) similarly noted that it was ‘unacceptable for 
advance care plans, including Do Not Attempt Resuscitation orders, to be applied in a blanket fashion to any 
group of people.’  
21 https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/politica/2020/06/11/nasce-commissione-inchiesta-covid-19_5a09ff08-019f-
4489-a251-33e5c08fa590.html (accessed 29.11.20). 
22 https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Research_report_health.pdf (accessed 28.11.20). 
23 Ibid. 
24 DE GAUDIO Raffaele and LANINI Iacopo, Vivere e Morire in Terapia Intensiva: Quotidianità in Bietica e 
Medicina Palliativa ; Firenze, Firenze University Press; 2013; 26. 
economic justice - not least where health is concerned – can seldom be absolutely guaranteed even where 
ostensibly robust, domestic human rights frameworks are evidently in place25. As Heri has recently argued, 
international human rights law may easily overlook certain deeply ingrained « assumptions and biases that prevent 
it from adequately capturing real-life harms and inequalities26 ».  
 
5. Conclusion  
The long term ethical, and human rights-related, impacts of the global pandemic cannot yet be accurately or fully 
predicted. The European Court of Human Rights has begun to see litigation triggered by pandemic-led rationing27; 
this follows an earlier warning to signatory states that an overwhelming spate of claims might best be avoided by 
addressing such actions at domestic level. The President of the Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE) 
has acknowledged that the pandemic’s effects appear to have been ‘particularly severe for the most vulnerable 
groups’ meaning that « human rights concerns in member States are likely to increase the caseload of the ECtHR. 
That is why it will be in the interest of this Court that as many cases as possible are resolved at national level28 
». This does not bode well for pending cases such as Le Mailloux v. France, where the Aix and Region Medical 
Association (SMAER) - together with two individual claimants – sought injunctive relief against the State, to 
require it to provide citizens, patients, doctors and health professionals with appropriate personal protective 
equipment (PPE)  and to offer mass screening facilities29. The urgent application was dismissed by the Conseil 
d’État, potentially giving rise to infringements of European Convention Articles 2, 3, 8 and 10, given the French 
State’s failure to protect the lives and physical integrity of those within its jurisdiction. Significantly, in addition 
to the issues of restricting access to specific forms of treatment and diagnostic tests - and a failure to adopt 
preventive measures - the issue of interference with the private lives of those who have died of Covid-19 ‘on their 
own’ 30 is also relevant. Arguably, this represents an opportunity for meaningful judicial analysis of the extent to 
which domestic states might be obliged by the Convention to actively address health crises, via engagement in 
equitable – or at least practicable - resource allocations, so as to prevent abject violations of fundamental human 
rights. Countries such as Italy and the UK should be especially interested in the outcome. Given the speed with 
 
25 MOYN Samuel, Not enough: Human rights in an unequal world; Harvard: Harvard University Press; 2018. 
26 HERI Corina, « Justifying New Rights: Affectedness, Vulnerability, and the Rights of Peasants » in German 
Law Journal, 2020, 21, 702–720, 702. 
27 Le Mailloux v. France (no. 18108/20); judgment is expected on Dec 3rd 2020.  
28 https://rm.coe.int/ccje-2020-2-statement-of-the-ccje-president-3-lessons-and-challenges-c/16809ed060 
(19.10.20) 
29 Ibid.  They were also seeking the prescription and administration of certain drug combinations 
(hydroxychloroquin and azithromycin)  
30 https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-
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which the matter has been dealt with however (at the time of writing) it seems likely that a finding of 
inadmissibility is the most probable outcome, entirely in keeping with the CCJE’s  earlier directive urging member 
states to settle such matters at national level. 
If decision-making by domestic states continues on its current trajectory however, it seems likely that increasingly 
acute and chronic forms of vulnerability will repeatedly arise. Likewise, if sharp cuts to medical budgets continue 
to be made, profound consequences will no doubt follow in terms of abject health rights violations, of those who 
are most vulnerable.  The need for states to adopt a « responsive approach31 » that will address rather than 
exacerbate -or indeed add to - human vulnerability, is clear. And yet, as Newdick has argued, domestic 
governments do tend to engage in economy-led structural adjustments when they are faced with dwindling 
resource issues and a need to ration services and supplies. Egregiously thrifty management of the public purse 
strings tends to follow on from such an exercise (as do taxation increases). An « at all costs » approach to the task 
of protecting – or more accurately saving – increasing fragile health systems32, should clearly provoke significant 
concern amongst human rights advocates and health law practitioners. Any ethics-compliant blueprint for 
surviving a deadly pandemic must at least acknowledge that « new norm » vulnerabilities now exist (i.e. in ICU 
units, care homes, or in the minds of those who may need medical attention but deny themselves on the basis that 
it is somehow unpatriotic, or cowardly, to burden an already overstretched health service33.) As Harwood has 
stressed, it should have long been apparent to the government that shared weaknesses in care homes (not least 
physical and socio-economic) would be key, inevitable factors in the spread or containment of infection. A media-
led demonisation of acute hospital care occurred quite early on in the first wave of the pandemic and should not 
be ignored. Not everyone who seeks out medical attention will inevitably go on to need intervention, urgent 
treatment or indeed hospital admission. Not all patients admitted to hospital will then require nursing in an over-
stretched intensive care unit (ICU) or the prolonged use of a scarce ventilator. In terms of using algorithms to 
determine whether or not to permit or withhold patient treatment, it should also be remembered that the absence 
or presence of certain vulnerabilities (or indeed frailties) will not necessarily indicate that a patient’s death is about 
to occur34. It seems fair to conclude that an ethical, human rights-compliant template for decision-making is now 
 
31 FINEMAN Martha; « Vulnerability and Inevitable Inequality » in Oslo Law Review; 2017, 4, 133; FINEMAN 
Martha; « Beyond Equality and Discrimination »; Law Review Forum; 2020, 73, 51. 
32 See further DONNELLY Laura, « Protect the NHS' message led to 90 per cent drop in hospital admissions » in 
The Telegraph; 2020, available at https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/10/18/protect-nhs-message-led-90-
per-cent-drop-admissions/ (Accessed 31.10.20). 
33 HARWOOD Rowan, « Did the UK response to the COVID-19 pandemic fail frail older people? »; available at 
https://www.bgs.org.uk/blog/did-the-uk-response-to-the-covid-19-pandemic-fail-frail-older-people  (Accessed 
31.10.20). 
34 Ibid. 
urgently needed; it seems unlikely that one will be emerging any time soon though, where states are continuing 
to vastly underfund health systems and services. 
 
